This paper presents an investigation of global recovery from the Great Recession and the rebalancing of global external imbalances, using a global model of 16 countries and composite regions. The model applies to the short term and only to the real side. Key features are demand-driven output determination, pro-cyclical aggregate labour productivity, imperfect competition in product markets and simple bargaining in non-clearing labour markets, which together determine the functional distribution of income. Trade is modelled in a bilateral import matrix; particular attention is paid to international adjustment. Simulation results suggest that early exit from fiscal support threatens a fragile recovery. Further, domestic demand expansion and revaluation in real terms in surplus countries are necessary for rebalancing, and a variety of measures can be employed to achieve these goals.
Introduction
The Great Recession, emanating from US real-estate and financial markets, has cost a multitude of jobs all around the world. The financial panic of 2008 and 2009 destroyed vast amounts of wealth, and threatens to solidify a trend of increasing inequality within countries. Much ink has been spilled on the various factors feeding into the crisis.
High on the list is lax financial regulation. Furthermore, after the new economy bubble burst, longer term global interest rates remained suppressed due to policy-driven purchases of developed-country assets by both Asian merchandise and Middle Eastern energy exporters. The combination of these factors led to a lending frenzy. Wall Street recycled the world's surpluses to US households via subprime loans and to Eastern Europe as well as the southern eurozone, via German, French and Austrian banks. In the process, bankers and shadow bankers everywhere also lent to each other, to lever up. Quite classically, when the asset side of their balance sheets deteriorated, or they couldn't roll over their liabilities, or both, banks faced a maturity, a currency or a maturity and a currency mismatch.
remaining columns show savings, taxes and export revenue relative to GDP, as well as exports relative to global exports. A few quick insights can be gleaned from these data. World GDP (in the model aggregation) adds to roughly US$60 trillion, two-thirds of which stem from developed countries, another 16% from the BRICS, 5% from energy exporters and the remaining 13% from developing countries. The USA has overall a low savings rate; Japan, energy exporters, Russia, India and China and eurozone surplus countries feature high savings rates. High private demand in the USA finds its expression in a high external deficit, energy and manufacturing exporters feature the matching surpluses. Labour market data are summarised by the unemployment rate. The values are based on population, labour force, employment and unemployment data from national statistics offices, regional development banks as well as the International Labour Organization (ILO)'s Laborsta and EAPEP databases. Reported unemployment rates are used where available; where not available, estimates based on the highest quality underlying data are used. All unemployment rates are for 2008, as are the rest of the data. US unemployment, for example, averaged below 6% for 2008. Of course, the rate has since risen to about 10%. Are our data out of date? It is always difficult to compile large and up-to-date datasets. However, the results can still be interpreted with current conditions in mind, since what matters most are the relative size of the economies, their external economic relationships as well as the direction of change of, for example, unemployment rates.
Bilateral trade data are presented in Table 2 . Table 2A shows the levels of country-by-country (region-by-region) exports and imports in billions of 2008 US dollars. Read along rows, the table reports exports; read along columns, it reports imports. Rows 17-19 indicate exports, imports and the differences between them-since we are abstracting from income payments and transfer, this is equal to the current account. Table 2B reports bilateral import propensities in percentage points, so that the column sums at the bottom show country and region aggregate import propensities. In levels, the largest economies show the largest volumes of exports and imports. Only the USA and China are large enough to show large trade volumes as individual countries; otherwise, composite regions weigh heavily and regional links are apparent. In shares, however, the regional links become still more important. The strongest trade links appear within the three European regions (plus Russia), within the five Asian regions (India, China, Japan, plus the rest of Asia surplus and deficit regions), within the Americas (Canada, the USA, Latin America and the Caribbean plus Brazil) as well as from the world to energy exporters. Africa-both South Africa and the rest of Africa, excluding energy exporters-show the least integration with the world economy, though Africa's highest degree of integration is apparent vis-à-vis the European regions. As will be seen in the next section, the transmission of shocks throughout the world economy is crucially tied to this regionally dominated trade structure.
Next, we discuss the model to which this dataset is applied.
A global model of demand and distributive conflict
The model falls within the general category of empirical economy-wide models, often labelled, slightly misleadingly, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. 5 Its structure fits broadly in the tradition of Rowthorn (1982) , Dutt (1984) and Taylor (1985) , even though the rate of accumulation is exogenous. Of course, one might desire an investment function. Empirically, however, they tend to be unreliable and 5 A CGE model is based on a social accounting matrix, which depicts detailed data on relations of production and distribution between the main socio-economic agents in an economy. The model adds behavioural relationships to the accounting; econometric evidence is applied to calibrate relevant parameters. The complete model can then be used to calculate counterfactuals in response to assumed shocks and policies. For standard discussions of the methodology, see the pioneering contributions by Taylor (Taylor and Lysy, 1979; Taylor, 1983) , as well as Pyatt (1988) or Robinson (2006) . A previous discussion of this paper is available as von Arnim (2010) . 
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Note: Table 2A reports 2008 trade volumes in billions of current US dollars in the base-year model dataset. (D) and (S) in the top row stand for the deficit and surplus region, respectively. Row 17 sums total country and region exports (across rows), row 18 sums total imports (down columns). Row 19 is the difference, the current account. In Table 2B , each cell shows (in percentage points) the ratio of the corresponding cell in Table 2A to regional total imports. The column sum of Table 2B reports the aggregate import share in total supply. elasticities are sparse for the large set of countries put together here. An exogenous rate of accumulation renders domestic demand always wage led, since an increase in real wages (not matched by productivity increases) feeds into consumption, but does not reduce capital accumulation. If, on the other hand, investment was sensitive to changes in profitability-or, equivalently, real unit labour costs-then a strong decrease in investment compared with the increase in consumption could render demand profit led. However, as households in the North are struggling to reduce debt to income ratios and households in the South (and East) have huge potential for consumption catch up, it might indeed be reasonable to assume demand to be wage led. Product and labour markets are modelled in a simple but comprehensive manner. The size of the mark-up depends on the degree of competition in product markets. High mark-ups, of course, imply high profit shares. Demand is a function of expenditure levels, the multiplier and the real exchange rate. The multiplier increases with redistribution towards wage earners, due to their lower propensity to save. Demand also changes with prices: all else equal, higher domestic prices imply a real appreciation and a higher import share-which lowers the multiplier. A real appreciation also has a negative impact on the level of external demand. In that way, expenditures, prices and distribution all affect the value added. Employee households earn labour income; owner households capital income. They bargain in labour markets over nominal wages, the single argument being the rate of employment in a simple wage curve. Further, labour productivity depends on demand conditions, due to labour hoarding as well as overhead labour. The ratio of the real wage and labour productivity is equal to the real unit labour cost. The higher the worker's real wage relative to their productivity, the higher is the wage share.
In the following paragraphs, we present first a one-country version (Section 3.1), then discuss dynamic stability in two dimensions (Section 3.2) and briefly consider issues pertaining to the multiregion model (Section 3.3).
A one-country version
Let us begin here with the underlying accounting. First:
is GDP at factor cost. Y is the real GDP, Q the GDP deflator, w the nominal wage rate and L an index of (hourly) employment, so that wL is the wage bill. Similarly, r is the rate of profit and PK the stock of capital K valued at the supply price P. It follows that:
where ψ is the wage and π the profit share. Without intermediates, adding import to factor costs gives total cost, which is equal to total supply:
where the subscript f indicates the foreign country and real exports M f are the imports of the foreign country from this economy, valued at the domestic supply price P.
Household income, in turn:
is divided between consumption PC and taxes and savings, (s + t)QY. Government saving is:
where t is the uniform net tax rate and G are real government expenditures. S G , of course, tends to be negative. Foreign saving is:
the negative of the current account. e is the nominal exchange rate, quoted as the domestic currency price of one unit of foreign currency. Private saving, sQY, is the sum of savings out of wage and profit income, sQY = s π rPK + s ψ wL, so that the aggregate propensity to save can be written as a negative function of the wage share:
The price of a unit of GDP, Q, is the mark-up price on nominal unit labour costs. Writing average labour productivity as ξ = Y/L, nominal unit labour costs are wL/Y = w/ξ and the mark-up price follows as:
where τ is the mark-up rate and 1 + τ = 1/(1 -π). The mark-up price goes back to Kalecki-see Lee (1998, Part III) for an extensive survey. The supply price P follows from cost accounting. Imports can be written as M = mX and since Y = (1 -m)X, the supply price can be expressed as the weighted average of the price of domestic content and import prices:
P as a cost price is anchored by factor prices. The pass through of exchange rate shocks or foreign inflation is limited, but plays an important role in determining domestic price changes and therewith real exchange rate changes. Next, the nominal wage rate w is determined by a simple wage curve, according to which a higher employment rate leads to higher bargained wage levels:
where w 0 is an 'intercept', w 1 the bargaining elasticity and L/N the employment ratesee Oswald (1990, 1995) , as well as Carlin and Soskice (1990) . 6 The profit rate r follows as a positive function of the profit share, the rate of capacity utilisation u = Y/K and the price ratio Q/P:
Let us now consider demand, savings, productivity and labour demand in turn. Total
, with the multiplier:
Real imports, M = mX, are a function of the real exchange rate ρ = eP f /P and production X:
where m 0 is an 'intercept', and α and β are the price and income elasticity of import demand, respectively. In the short term, labour productivity, ξ, increases in the rate of capacity utilisation:
u due to labour hoarding as well as overhead labour. Labour hoarding refers to the fact that firms retain skilled employees throughout a downturn because retraining new employees in the upturn would be costlier; overhead labour refers to the fact that firms usually have some back-office and managerial staff not easily made expendable. With GDP Y and productivity ξ determined, labour demand follows as:
This labour demand function is consistent with fixed proportions technology and varying unit labour requirements, and implies Okun's law, since pro-cyclical labour productivity dampens the employment effect of a demand expansion. Now, we can investigate dynamic stability in two dimensions.
Dynamic stability
A dynamic version of the model is presented here in the rate of capacity utilisation and the share of labour income. We present this stylised model in order to emphasise key macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms. How does it relate to the version above?
The dynamic version describes one country (instead of many regions) with a real wage curve (instead of a nominal wage curve and a full price system) 7 and a net export emphasises the theoretical and empirical relevance of specifying separate wage and price functions, which will then combine to determine the real wage.
7 Also see footnote 6. The purpose of assuming a real wage curve in this section is to reduce dimensionality. The core causal links remain the same.
at University of Utah on December 12, 2012 http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ function that responds to real unit labour costs (instead of import functions responsive to real exchange rate changes). The advantage is that we can consider stability in two dimensions, and focus on what matters. First, the dynamic goods market specification is a simple excess demand function. Second, inflation is fundamentally driven by conflict, which is here expressed in terms of the functional distribution of income. With simple adaptive dynamics (and endogenous equilibrium values for the rate of utilisation and the labour share), the time paths of the dynamic version will converge to the comparative static equilibria, excluding the simplifications, of course. Hence, the principal structure of the two models is the same.
Let us first consider a closed economy. The investment rate is assumed to be exogenous, but the rate of accumulation permitted by savings depends on utilisation and distribution:
Dynamic adjustment in the goods market is standard. Excess demand triggers firms to increase the rate of utilisation. Since u = g I /s, this can be written as:
where α is a sign-preserving speed-of-adjustment parameter. With the rate of utilisation as the adjusting variable, the dynamics best describe the short term.
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A generic wage curve describes bargaining:
with e the employment rate and θ the technologically determined full employment capital labour ratio. In what follows, we set θ = 1 for simplicity. Generically, endogenous labour productivity is:
The price and distribution system can be described by the dynamics of the wage share. Following the theory of conflict inflation (Rowthorn, 1977; Taylor, 1991) , prices and distributive shares are subject to class conflict, so that the change in the wage share becomes:
with β also being a sign-preserving speed-of-adjustment parameter. The bargained nominal wage rises with higher demand, but falls with higher productivity due to the negative effect on employment. The differential equation simply means that real wage increases in excess of productivity increases lead to a higher wage share. Note that we will assume here that inflation is constant (or zero); in other words, we consider a real wage curve. 9 The dynamic behaviour of the system can be summarised in the Jacobian:
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The sign of the upper-right entry is positive (s ψ < 0) and determines the demand regime as wage led. The sign of the lower-left entry determines that the distributive regime:
is either greater or smaller than zero. Since both entries on the main diagonal are negative, γ < 0 would ensure a positive determinant. The system is then stable with wage-led demand and forced saving distributional adjustment. If γ > 0 and distributional adjustment exhibits a profit squeeze, Det[J] > 0 if:
which is certainly satisfied, even with substantial differences in class saving rates and a private sector deficit, as long as γ is not 'large'. Let us now include net exports. The change in the utilisation rate can be written as:
where g N = (E -M)/K is the ratio of net exports to the capital stock. It responds negatively to utilisation and real unit labour costs. This is surely a stylised net export function, but since domestic wage increases lead to a higher price level and real appreciation, the assumed mechanism is not too farfetched. See Naastepad (2006) for an extensive discussion of a model with a similar set up. The first row of the Jacobian changes:
can take either sign (note that g s u s ψ ψ = ). If negative, reduced real unit labour costs have a stimulating effect, because the increase in external demand outweighs the decrease in consumption. This case corresponds to a profit-led demand regime, η > 0 is wage led. Since g u N < 0 , the upper-left entry is still negative and larger in magnitude: imports stabilise quantity adjustment. As a result, the trace remains negative. For the sign of the determinant, two cases need to be distinguished: if γ and η are of opposite sign, Det[J] > 0 and the system is stable. If γ and η are of same sign,
>γ η . The potential instability in the second case arises due to the positive feedback, for example, from higher costs through wage-led demand to higher demand and from higher demand via profit squeeze to higher wage shares. As above, the own feedback channels tend to be stronger than the distributive-demand links, certainly making the sum s g u N −
larger than the product γη.
The multiregion model: international closure and calibration
The multiregion model has the same structure as the simple model presented above. The equations of the multiregion model are listed in Table 3 . Here, we want to focus on bilateral trade and exchange rates. Each country features a real import demand function vis-à-vis any other country, with the bilateral real exchange rate and the importing country's level of income as arguments. The country's total imports and exports follow from the relevant aggregation: summation across all other countries' imports from this country implies an aggregate export function; summation across all other countries' exports to this country implies an aggregate import function. See equation 12 in Table 3 for the latter. Let us as well briefly consider the system of exchange rates. Note that there are two regions for the eurozone, both of which of course share the same currency-which means that there are n -2 = 14 exchange rates. Given that the US dollar serves as the world reserve currency, it makes sense to express all exchange rates in terms of it. As an example, real exchange rates between three countries and the USA indexed as Country 1 can be written as:
and analogously for all other countries. The important implication is that a model with 16 regions with 15 currencies has only 14 degrees of freedom in international accounts, but 29 candidate variables: the 14 exchange rates as well as 15 current accounts. Simulation scenarios and simulation results depend crucially on international 'closure' assumptions. A system similar to the one suggested here has been used in von Arnim (2009) . That system, as this one, is a straightforward multicountry extension of standard income and elasticities approaches in open-economy macroeconomics. Here, the focus will be on fixed nominal exchange rates and endogenous current accounts.
Before we move on to scenario analysis, let us explain the calibration of crucial parameters. We should distinguish between accounting and behavioural parameters. Accounting parameters are implied by data; examples include tax rates as well as macroeconomic savings propensities. The distribution of savings between wage and profit recipients (s ψ and s π ), however, is not set by the data and is therefore behavioural. Other behavioural parameters are the employment rate elasticity of nominal wages 
, the demand elasticity of labour productivity (ξ 1 ), and the price and income elasticities of imports. We estimate these trade elasticities for many countries in our dataset and apply GDP-weighted averages to the relevant regions. 10 For the savings parameters, we assume that profit income recipients save twice as much as wage income recipients.
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We set the demand elasticity of productivity as ξ 1 = 0.4, which implies
12 Broadly in line with Okun's and Verdoorn's laws, employment grows only a bit more than half as fast as demand. 13 Lastly, we set w 1 = 0.75. Ideally, of course, all these elasticities should be estimated for each single country.
For this paper, our focus is on trade elasticities, so that we complement the discussion with a sensitivity analysis of selected parameters (see Figure 1 ).
14 As expected, an increase in the average employment rate elasticity of nominal wages w 1 across countries increases the world GDP growth rate-since demand is wage led, a higher increase in nominal wages presents further gains. Similarly, an increase in the average ratio of class savings propensities s ψ /s π leads to higher GDP growth-since demand is wage led, similar class behaviour reduces the impact of redistribution on the multiplier. Lastly, we test the impact of changes in the US trade elasticity. Overall, these tests suggest that simulation results are not dominated by reasonably expected variations on these parameters.
Scenarios
This section reports simulation results. Four scenarios are considered, all with a viewpoint of effects on global growth and imbalances. We begin with a reduction of US government borrowing, often touted as the solution to US external imbalances. However, as will be seen, improvements in the external balance come at a significant cost in terms of output and employment. Second, a revaluation of China's currency vis-à-vis the US dollar is necessary in the medium term to support rebalancing, but in the short term it might not help as much as often hoped. Third, incomes and social policies in Asia's surplus countries can aid rebalancing and support global recovery. Fourth, we consider coordinated policies between Asia and Europe. In addition to the policy changes applied in Scenario 3, we introduce nominal wage increases and fiscal expansion in European surplus countries. Table 6 presents an overview of key macroeconomic statistics for all four scenarios and Tables 7-10 more detailed results for each in turn. 10 The elasticities applied are uniform across trade partners. Ideally, trade elasticities should be bilateral, but the data requirements for the estimations are exorbitant and we have to content ourselves with what is available.
11 Equation 15 in Table 3 offers one degree of freedom, the second-to determine both s ψ and s π -comes from the assumption about the relationship between the two parameters. Given levels of base-year GDP and savings as well as the profit share, we can then solve for s ψ and s π .
12 A 'hat' over a variable denotes a proportional growth rate. 13 For recent empirical discussions of these matters, see the seminal collection in McCombie et al. (2003) , as well as Chen et al. (2007) . Naastepad (2006, p. 409 ) presents a short but fitting discussion of causal links.
14 For sensitivity analysis, we calibrate the model with the behavioural parameter under consideration drawn from a uniform probability distribution with appropriate bounds and repeatedly solve the model subject to a generic shock. See Figure 1 for further details and von Arnim (2011) for a similar procedure applied to a structurally similar model. 
Reduction of US public deficit
There are several reasons to consider a reduction of US public borrowing. The political pressure to reduce public debt is immense, even in the face of continued high unemployment. It is often said that the US's profligate ways have to change, that her overall rate of saving has to increase. Without that, the argument goes, the external deficit cannot be corrected. Reducing government dissaving is one way to do that, one that Note: This figure reports sensitivity analysis. For the top two panels, the horizontal axis shows employment rate elasticities w 1 drawn from a uniform probability distribution with limits 0.25 and 1.25. For the middle two panels, the horizontal axis shows the ratio of class savings propensities, s ψ /s π , drawn from a uniform probability distribution with limits 0.2 and 0.8. For the lower two panels, the horizontal axis shows the US import price elasticity, drawn from a uniform probability distribution with limits 0 and 1. The vertical axes show world GDP growth and the change in the ratio of cumulative world current account imbalance relative to GDP following an increase in US real investment that represents 1% of US GDP. The vertical axes show percentage points. 
1990-2009
Note: The table reports price and income elasticities of import demand for selected countries. See Table 2 or the Appendix for abbreviations of regions. Trade elasticities are not based on bilateral trade data, but reflect each country's aggregate real import time series. Bilateral trade elasticities were not estimated due to data limitations and the scope of such an estimation. 'GDP weight' is the in-region weight of the country. 'Calc. weight' is the weight with which the reported elasticities enter the averaged regional elasticities in the right part of the table. For all regions except Africa and energy exporters, the countries entering the calculation represent at least 50% of composite GDP. In the column on sources, 'KALY' represents elasticities taken from Kwack et al. (2007) and 'Ivanova represents' elasticities taken from Ivanova (2007) . All other elasticities are based on our own calculations. 'LL' indicates a log-linear regression, '1 st ' a first-differenced model, 'R' data based on IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) real exchange rate indexes, and 'P' data based on the ratio of a domestic CPI and import prices, as well from IMF IFS. The most robust results were used. See the Appendix for further details. plays into entrenched beliefs about twin (public and external) deficits. 15 To implement this simulation, the ratio of the public deficit to GDP in the USA is decreased by two percentage points, from the base year value of 6.6% to 4.6%. (Note that the government deficit usually is endogenous, but is now fixed and real government expenditures are made flexible to achieve this target.) The simulation results are shown in Table 7 . 16 The immediate effect is a sizeable contraction of GDP in the USA. The US unemployment rate increases by three percentage points. The US external balance relative to GDP improves by about 1.4 percentage points. Is this a success? Not so: real exports actually decrease, while real imports fall by much more. Due to the slight real depreciation, real exports decrease more moderately than those of other countries. Specifically, improvement in the current account is the result of reduced income and import demand. This reduction of external demand for the rest of the world is sufficiently large to induce a global downturn. 15 The argument works through the interest channel: budget deficits push up interest rates, which leads to portfolio investment and exchange appreciation. The resulting trade deficit adds to global imbalances. Salvatore (2007) investigates the case empirically; Mussa (2007) suggests that particularly in the US case, this is 'largely nonsense'. Also see Barbosa-Filho et al. (2008) for evidence that private and external deficit coincided over the relevant period. 16 The aggregation in the results tables (Tables 6-10) differs from the regional aggregation fed into the model. This is for the reader's convenience, since we are most interested in the performance of commonly used regional aggregates. Table 2 or the Appendix for abbreviations of regions. 'GDP weight' is the in-region weight of the country. 'Calc. weight' is the weight with which the reported wage share enters the averaged regional wage share in the right part of the table. For the European countries, the Ameco database provides wage shares for (almost) all countries, so that exact weights were used. See the Appendix for further details on data sources.
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http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from Table 6 . Scenario: overview Note: All entries are in percentage points. The columns report growth rates of GDP (GDP), the change in the unemployment rate (Δu), the change of the ratio of the current account relative to GDP (Δca) and the change of the ratio of government saving to GDP (Δsg) for four scenarios. Note that the change of the ratio of the current account relative to GDP (CA/Y) for the world is the cumulative current account of all deficit regions. Regional trade links are important for the international transmission of the shock. The USA is by far the most important export market for both Canada, and Latin America and the Caribbean. About three-quarters of all exports from Canada go to the USA, from Latin America about half. The sharp decrease in total import volume makes these two regions particularly vulnerable to the US downturn. Their negative GDP growth rates rank relatively high for both Latin America and Canada; behind the USA, where the shock originates. Because the USA and Canada weigh heavily among developed countries, the recession is more pronounced there than in developing countries, even though Japan and Europe are not much affected.
Globally, the contraction of demand does lead to the correction of global imbalances by one fifth of a percentage point of world GDP. However, this comes at a significant cost. The global increase in unemployment rates does not bode well for a sustained recovery from the crisis with early exit from fiscal support.
To summarise, let us emphasise the relevant chain of causation. First, the USA reduces domestic demand. The country falls into recession, GDP decreases and the unemployment rate rises. Through the demand channel, US imports fall, which spreads the contraction particularly to important trade partners. On the price side, wages-the key cost item-fall, which leads to deflation. This is most pronounced in the USA, where the shock emanates. As a result, the country's external price competitiveness improves, which buffers the decrease in real exports from demand contraction in the rest of the world. Overall, quantity effects rule, as would be expected in a demand-driven model.
Next, we consider a price shock.
Revaluation of China's currency
Chinese monetary authorities have accumulated tremendous amounts of US dollar reserves in their efforts to maintain a stable and competitive exchange rate. The current account surplus relative to GDP has steadily increased and in 2008 stood at about 9% of GDP. The US-China bilateral current account features prominently, with about US$150 billion worth of goods and services more sold to the USA from China than vice versa. Attempting to counteract negative effects of the global crisis, currency policy had 'restiffened' in late 2008, after a period of somewhat faster nominal appreciation. Currently, the Chinese yuan is traded in a carefully designed daily band. What would revaluation of the Chinese currency do for global rebalancing? The simulation is implemented through a 20% increase of the US dollar price of one Chinese yuan. Since all other nominal exchange rates are assumed unchanged, this implies a nominal appreciation of China's currency by almost 17% against all other regions' currencies. The result is a real effective appreciation of about 14%. As a result, the current account-to-GDP ratio increases from 9% to 9.2%: the proportional change of GDP is larger than that of net exports (see Table 8 ). In the short term, revaluation does not do much for reducing global imbalances. In fact, relative to the base year, global imbalances increase, even if only marginally.
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In the USA, on the other hand, the real depreciation of about 1.8% is contractionary. Real depreciation can be contractionary if trade elasticities are low and the shock 
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Note: See notes for Table 7 .
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from transmission through regional trade links does not work in favour of the country under consideration. For the USA, both are the case. Not only is her import price elasticity relatively low, but developing regions represent crucial export markets. In summary, currency depreciation in the USA does not lead to an increase in real exports, since trade elasticities of key trade partners are too low; however, it does lead to a higher import bill. The result is contraction. In China, currency appreciation reduces net exports and triggers contraction. On the price side, China experiences deflation, whereas the US imports inflation. These results probably should be qualified. There are good reasons to believe that the J-curve will turn. Over the medium term, sectoral reallocation can take place and will aid adjustment.
What does it all mean for China? The unemployment rate rises by more than one-and-a-half percentage points. The socio-economic implications of the lack of continued strong formal sector job growth make this a difficult political option to pursue. There are, however, alternative policies that do not have this negative impact and have greater potential to aid a reduction of global imbalances. One example might be income policies in Asian surplus countries.
Rebalancing Asia
For Asia, the rebound from the radically fast and sharp drop in external demand has been surprisingly short. Deepening regional integration plays a role, as does the growth of domestic markets. Significant fiscal stimulus has also helped to mitigate adverse effects and it represents a step in the direction of rebalancing demand towards domestic sources. What beyond fiscal stimulus can the region do to aid global rebalancing without endangering recovery? This simulation emphasises the positive effects of higher social spending and improved social security nets. Ideally, the transfer of social insurance to the public sector provides an immediate double benefit-the initial increase in spending and a resulting decrease in precautionary saving rates from lower income households. The policy changes are implemented here in the Asian surplus region (AS) and China (BR4) as a decrease of the net tax rate and a decrease in the propensity to save of wage-earning households. Additionally, it is assumed that overall nominal wages increase. Such a shift further supports domestic consumption, without directly hurting external competitiveness through nominal exchange appreciation.
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The results are presented in Table 9 and are clearly globally reflationary. For the rest of the world, higher growth in Asia represents increased external demand. Global imbalances are reduced slightly. China grows strongly at almost 4%. China's current account surplus relative to GDP falls significantly compared to the base year, from 9% to 6.7%. The Asian aggregate region grows as well at almost 2%, but its aggregate external deficit increases slightly. That is largely due to the fairly strong in-region growth; the Asian deficit region's current account relative to GDP worsens by half a percentage point, outweighing the Asian surplus region's reduction. Income inequality-as 
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http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ measured by the functional distribution of income-decreases. 19 Increases in the wage share should be interpreted carefully. Principally, wage-share changes in this model are cyclical and it is not obvious that they will last. However, if higher real wages become structurally embedded, they can translate into improvements in the personal distribution of income, even if productivity growth catches up. Fiscal balances across Asia remain sound. In summary, strengthening social safety nets represents an additional route for Asian economies to reduce dependence on exports, to deepen domestic markets and to contribute to sustainable recovery from the Great Recession.
A coordinated scenario: pro-labour policies in surplus countries
Europe is only the most recent pinball of global financial turmoil that began in 2008. The Great Recession has strained previously sound fiscal balances, for example in Spain, and has exposed less sound fiscal balances in Greece. The contention that these countries can liquidate themselves back to health appears to be always briefly popular with investors, until it is remembered that fiscal restraint is contractionary and very well can increase the ratio of public deficit to GDP. The vacuous but excited debate about these issues takes the light from where it should be shone: the fact that 'common' monetary policy is made in the spirit of and for Germany, and no common fiscal policy exists. The practical question is what Europe can do about its internal imbalances, aside from various 'lifeline' stability funds.
The answer to this question must be a political one; the model certainly cannot answer such questions. It can, however, point towards the principal changes necessary for internal rebalancing. As on a global level, rebalancing requires expenditure shifts and the corresponding price changes. Within the eurozone, nominal exchange rate changes cannot help; the burden of adjustment falls on wages, and nominal wage increases in eurozone surplus countries are one possible way to go. Further fiscal expansion is another.
In this scenario, we increase nominal wages and real government expenditures in eurozone surplus countries by 10%, in addition to the social and pro-labour policies applied in the previous (rebalancing Asia) scenario. The results are clearly expansionary and reduce global imbalances. The chain of causation begins with increased domestic demand in surplus countries. Income and consumption growth in eurozone and Asian surplus countries reduces global imbalances through the reduction of their surpluses. Imports increase through the income channel and exports decrease through the relative price channel. Crucially, the results show a global improvement in the functional distribution of income. This scenario highlights that rebalancing does not have to be-indeed, should not be-driven by contraction and deflation, but rather by a set of coordinated policies in surplus countries that reduce inequality and foster domestic demand.
Conclusions
What can be concluded based on these thought experiments? Policy makers around the world have at their disposal the tools to sustain a healthy global recovery as well as a reduction of global imbalances. In all regions, a crucial issue might be to think outside of the respective regional orthodoxy. Broad application of a variety of policies-including increased social spending, wage policies and well-targeted transfers-might replace the received wisdom of targeting inflation and letting 'the markets' figure out the rest. Importantly, none of the examples laid out here lead to exploding government borrowing. Certainly, the model is ill-suited to address the issue of debt sustainability, but it surely highlights the fact that pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies do not aid recovery and rebalancing. incomplete, the methodology for estimating 2008 taxes from the SNA database for all estimated countries is to multiply the ratio of data-year taxes to data-year GDP, and multiply that by the 2008 GDP. The total tax for the data year is accumulated from the following detailed fields: While data collected from Table 4 .1 are disaggregated, data from Table 2 .1 are possibly incomplete, since they do not include income or wealth taxes or social contributions. However, many of the countries for which data are only available in Table 2 .1 may not collect income or wealth taxes and social contributions. Their primary tax source is then production or value-added taxes or tariffs, so that the majority of tax collections are reflected in Table 2 .1. Social benefits, part of Table 4 .1, were collected and netted against the gross tax rate. The current reported tax rate is thus net of any subsidies in the form of production or trade subsidies, or social benefits. Individual countries (the USA, Japan and BRICS) as well as the largest countries in each bloc of the model have been verified on the basis of IMF International Financial Statistics and national statistics offices. For these countries, net taxes in the model database were adjusted to match government deficits (and surpluses) relative to GDP. Specifically, eurozone as well as European countries' government deficit-to-GDP ratios were adjusted based on publications from the German national statistics office; Brazil and Mexico based on data from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB); USA based on the US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Australia, China, India, South Korea and Japan based on data from the Asian Development Bank (ADB); Russia based on data from the Economic Expert Group (http://www.eeg.ru/pages/148) in association with the Ministry of Finance; and Turkey and South Africa from the respective national treasury departments.
A4. Bilateral trade matrix
The principal source for the bilateral trade matrix is the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS; see http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e =170921). The trade data are presented by 'reporting countries' and 'partner countries' for exports and imports. The import matrix includes 'cost insurance and freight', often at a uniform rate of 10% across partner countries due to the general lack of data. Since imports are a cost item to the domestic firm in the model, the data used here rely mostly on the import matrix. Only where the export matrix provided additional data was it included. The DOTS data are aggregated into the region-by-region matrix that fits the model's aggregation scheme. Intraregional trade is not accounted for. The DOTS database covers only merchandise trade. In order to account for trade in services-and in fact for the overall current account-imports in the aggregated bilateral trade matrix have been scaled to reflect current accounts from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. While this represents a crude adjustment, it is feasible, whereas at University of Utah on December 12, 2012 http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from more complicated measures would require a global bilateral services trade matrix, which is not available.
A5. Employment and unemployment data
The following is a description of employment and unemployment data. In brief, population, labour force, employment and unemployment data stem from national statistics offices, regional development banks as well as ILO's Laborsta and EAPEP databases. Reported unemployment rates are used where available, with estimates based on the highest quality underlying data being used where not. Regional unemployment rates are calculated as GDP-weighted averages. More detail follows: Tables  1A, 2B and 3D from the ILO Laborsta database were used. Table 1A contains the total economically active population by country and in some cases the total population. The years of data availability varied from 2000 to 2008. Table 2B contains the employed population by country. The years of data availability varied from 2000 to 2008 and were matched when possible to the dates in Table 1A . Table 3D contains the unemployed population by country. The years of data availability varied from 2000 to 2008 and were matched to the date in Table 2B . Eurostat employment and unemployment rates are used for all countries where available. US and Canadian data are from national statistics offices. Asian country data, where available, were taken from ADB. Data for Latin American and Caribbean countries are from IADB. Selected countries have been verified against World Bank data. The timeliness and detail of employment and unemployment data vary widely by country. The approach was to use the best available data for each country. ILO's EAPEP database yields a 2008 estimate of the labour force for each country in the sample and is used when other data are not available. In combination with employment levels from national, regional and multilateral sources, or Laborsta if not available, the unemployment rate can be calculated.
A6. Functional distribution of income
Principally, wage shares are the total wage bill or employee compensation-relative GDP at factor cost. Estimates of wage shares are often not readily available for developing countries due to the importance of informal activities. Ideally, employee compensation as well as GDP at factor cost collected for formal economic activities should be adjusted by estimates for informal economic activities. Since labour productivity in the latter tends to be very low, this would represent an upward adjustment of the wage share. Where data were not available, reasonable adjustments have been made. The wage shares are reported in Table 5 . Data were collected from the following sources: (1) EUROPA-Economic and Financial Affairs-Indicators-Ameco database. The Ameco database calculates wage shares as compensation per employee relative to GDP at factor cost per employee. The Ameco data are the basis for wage-share estimates with a source denotation as 'EU'; (2) International Labour Organization and International Institute for Labour Studies: Charpe, M. 'All_WS_MC_INST.xls ' (2008) . These wage shares have been adjusted by a factor to include the self-employed. In the table, wage shares from this source are denoted as 'ILO'; (3) Rada (2010) ; and (4) Vasiliouk (2008) .
A7. Import elasticities
The trade structure requires price and income elasticities of import demand (see Table 4 ). The elasticities are either based on the author's calculations or taken from the literature. Data are taken from IMF International Financial Statistics. Quarterly data were used in all countries except Venezuela, Egypt and Pakistan. We use import volume and GDP volume indexed to 2005 for ease of comparison. For the price elasticity we calculated a relative price, if both the import price and GDP deflator were available. The relative price is calculated by using the implicit price deflator of imports divided by the implicit price deflator of domestic GDP. Where import prices were not available, the real effective exchange rate was used for the price elasticity calculation. This was also indexed to 2005 to provide continuity. Price and income elasticities are calculated using both a log-linear model and a first-difference log-linear model. The primary log-linear model follows the classical paper by Houthakker and Magee (1969) . The first-difference model is a differenced version of the Houthakker-Magee model seen in much of the trade elasticity literature, including Marquez (2002) . The primary regression in both cases uses OLS methods to regress the logarithm of the volume of imports on the logarithm of both domestic GDP and the relative price. The data for each country were tested for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The results were chosen based on their tests for stationarity and their statistical significance. In most cases, data from 1990-2009 were used in all countries where the elasticity was self-calculated. The exceptions to this date range were Morocco (1990 Morocco ( -2008 , South Africa (1990 -2006 ), Brazil (1995 -2009 and Argentina (1993 Argentina ( -2009 . For countries where data were unavailable or elasticity estimates were unreliable using conventional methods, the most recent papers from the trade elasticity literature were used. Using data from 1984 -2003 , Kwack et al. (2007 (referred to as KALY in Table 4 ) use an OLS method for 30 countries using pooled cross-country time series. The authors use a log-linear model controlling for the geographical distance between the capital city of the importing country and the capital city of the exporting country. Ivanova (2007) uses a vector error correction model to adjust for cointegration and estimates long-term elasticities for Russia.
